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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence for a single count of possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine), LC. § 37-2732 (c)(I). R 197-205. Relief should be 
granted because the state did not present sufficient evidence to support the conviction. 
Specifically, the state did not prove that Appellant Tami Southwick had knowledge and control 
of either the methamphetamine residue found on a scale enclosed in an opaque black bag or of 
the baggie of methamphetamine hidden in the passenger side door of the car she was driving. 
In the alternative, relief should be granted because the failure to give a unanimity 
instruction requiring the jury to agree as to which methamphetamine (the residue or the baggie) 
was possessed was fundamental error which denied Ms. Southwick's unwaived constitutional 
rights to a jury trial and due process and affected the verdict. 
B. Procedural History 
Ms. Southwick was charged with a single count of possession of methamphetamine in 
violation ofl.C. § 37-2732(c)(l). R 55-56. A jury found her guilty and she was subsequently 
sentenced to a term of three years fixed followed by three indeterminate for a total of six years. 
The court retained jurisdiction for 365 days. R 197-204. According to the district court register 
of actions, on March 21, 2014, Ms. Southwick was placed upon three years of probation. ROA 
3/21114. (Motion to Augment pending.) 
This appeal timely follows. R 203-205. 
C. Statement of the Case 
The state presented three witnesses to prove its case: Kevin Hanners and Russell Kerry, 
who were involved in a traffic stop of Ms. Southwick, and Jay Wiggins, from the state lab. Tr. p. 
2. 
Buhl Patrol Sergeant Hanners testified that on August 18, 2012, about 4:00 p.m., he 
stopped a car because of an expired registration sticker. Tr. p. 11, In. 11 - p. 12, In. 25. Ms. 
Southwick was driving and Kevin Mingo was in the passenger seat. Ms. Southwick said that she 
lived at Mr. Mingo's residence. Tr. p. 13, In. 5-25. Ms. Southwick told Sgt. Hanners that the 
registered owner of the car had given the car to her on the condition that she get it properly 
registered and insured. Tr. p. 15, In. 16-23. 
Sgt. Hanners testified that he asks "pretty much everybody out there that I come in 
contact with if they have anything illegal in their vehicles." Tr. p. 17, In. 21-25. He "further 
defines" this by asking specifically and individually about methamphetamine, marijuana, and 
paraphernalia. Tr. p. 18, In. 1-4. He testified that Ms. Southwick looked directly at him and 
stated "affirmative, no" when asked about marijuana. Tr. p. 18, In. 9-10. However, on both 
methamphetamine and paraphernalia, according to Sgt. Hanners, Ms. Southwick failed to make 
eye contact and "kind of drew out a no." Tr. p. 18, ln. 5-14. 
This made Sgt. Hanners suspicious, so he called for a canine officer. Tr. p. 18, In. 21-25. 
In the meantime, Mr. Mingo got out of the car. Mr. Mingo and Ms. Southwick had two 
dogs with them and Mr. Mingo was taking one of the dogs out to relieve itself. Tr. p. 19, In. 20-
25. 
Sgt. Hanners went to see what was going on and then watched as Mr. Mingo put the dog 
back in the car. Sgt. Hanners went back to his car and observed Mr. Mingo "moving around 
quite a bit," "leaning from side to side" "which is not consistent with people on traffic stops." 
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Sgt. Hanners testified that he had been doing traffic work a long time and had never seen anyone 
move around like that before. Tr. p. 20, In. 3-24. 
Sgt. Hanners and Deputy Wiggins, who had arrived with his canine partner, had Ms. 
Southwick, Mr. Mingo and their dogs get out of the car. Sgt. Hanners testified that Ms. 
Southwick "asked me, 'Because this is not my car, I'm not responsible for anything in the 
vehicle.'" Tr. p. 21, In. 15-18. 
While they watched the canine search, Mr. Mingo asked whether it is illegal to possess 
scales. Tr. p. 20, In. 25 - p. 21, In. 1. 
Deputy Wiggins searched the car and found a scale stuffed down in between the driver 
and passenger seats - it was not visible, but he found it when he reached in between the seats. Tr. 
p. 47, In. 15 - p. 48, In. 2. 
The scale was inside a black zippered case. To see the scale, the zipper had to be opened. 
Tr. p. 60, In. 25 - p. 61, In. 13. Sgt. Hanners could not recall whether the case was zippered shut 
or open when the officers found the scale. Tr. p. 64, ln. 23-25. Deputy Wiggins could not even 
recall what the scale looked like. Tr. p. 48, In. 6-8. Sgt. Hanners testified that the item could not 
be recognized as a digital scale before the case was opened, but once opened, it was possible to 
see methamphetamine residue on the scale. Tr. p. 65, In. 17-25. 
Sgt. Hanners testified that Ms. Southwick told him that she knew the scale was in the car, 
that she had been asked to hold it for another person, that it had been on the dash board, but was 
sliding around, and so she and Mr. Mingo put it between the seats to stop the sliding. Tr. p. 27, 
In. 2-8. 
In addition to the scale, the police found a baggie of methamphetamine inside the 
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passenger door panel - down at the bottom of the door. Tr. p. 49, In. 1-5. Deputy Wiggins, who 
discovered the baggie and gave it to Sgt. Hanners, could not remember whether the door panel 
was already removed or he had to remove it to find the baggie. Tr. p. 49, In. 6-8; p. 50, In. 1-4. 
He did remember that the baggie was not easily accessible and that he had to use his asp to get at 
it. Tr. p. 50, In. 10-15. 
The court instructed the jury: 
A person has possession of something if the person knows of its presence and has 
physical control of it or has the power and intention to control it. More than one 
person can be in possession of something if each knows of its presence and has 
the power and intention to control it. 
Second Supp. Tr. p. 89, In. 1-7. 
However, the jury was never instructed that it must unanimously agree as to which 
methamphetamine was possessed by Ms. Southwick - be that on the scale or in the baggie. 
Second Supp. Tr. p. 85, In. 1 - p 93, In. 8. 
In closing the state relied upon both the methamphetamine residue on the scale and the 
methamphetamine hidden inside the passenger door for a conviction. Second Supp. Tr. p. 98, In. 
10 -p. 99, In. 24. 
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the state present constitutionally sufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict? 
U.S. Const. Amends. 5 and 14; Idaho Const. Art. I,§ 13. 
2. Did the district court commit fundamental error in failing to give a unanimity 
instruction? U.S. Const. Amends. 5, 6 and 14; Idaho Const. Art. I,§ 7. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Evidence was Insufficient 
The conviction must be vacated and a judgment of acquittal entered because the evidence 
was insufficient. 
Due process requires that no person be convicted except upon proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt of every element of the offense. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,361 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1071 
(1970); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.307,315-6, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2787 (1979). 
In an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, a guilty verdict will be 
overturned when there is not substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could 
have found that the prosecution sustained the burden of proving the essential elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Warburton, 145 Idaho 760, 761-2, 185 P.3d 272, 273-4 (Ct. App. 
2008), citing State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383,385,957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1998); 
State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991). The appellate court 
does not substitute its view for that of the trier of fact as to the credibility of the witnesses, the 
weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. 
Id., citing Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001; State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683,684, 701 
P.2d 303, 304 (Ct. App. 1985). And, the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the 
state. Id., citing Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho at 385, 957 P.2d at 1101; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 
822 P.2d at 1001. However, if the evidence is not sufficient to support the conviction, the 
defendant is entitled to an acquittal. Herrera-Brito, supra. See also, State v. Curry, 153 Idaho 
394, 396-97, 283 P.3d 141, 143-44 (Ct. App. 2012). 
To establish possession, the state had to establish both that Ms. Southwick knew of the 
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drugs and had the power and intention to control them. State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237,242, 985 
P.2d 117, 122 (1999); State v. Seitter, 127 Idaho 356, 359, 900 P.2d 1367, 1370 (1995). 
Constructive possession of a controlled substance exists where a nexus between the accused and 
the substance is sufficiently proven so as to give rise to the reasonable inference that the accused 
was not simply a bystander, but rather had the power and intent to exercise dominion and control 
over the substance. State v. Rogerson, 132 Idaho 53, 58,966 P.2d 53, 58 (Ct. App. 1998); State 
v. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644, 647, 945 P.2d 1390, 1393 (Ct. App. 1997). Knowledge of the 
controlled substance and physical control of the controlled substance must be independently 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, by either circumstantial or direct evidence. Seitter, 127 Idaho 
at 360,900 P.2d at 1371; Rogerson, 132 Idaho at 58, 966 P.2d at 58; Rozajewski, 130 Idaho at 
647,945 P.2d at 1393. 
In this case, the state did not provide sufficient evidence. With regard to the scale, the 
state's evidence showed that the scale was contained in a zippered container. The residue could 
not be seen from outside the container. While the state did offer proof that Ms. Southwick knew 
that the container held a scale per her statement that she was holding the scale for someone else, 
the state offered no proof whatsoever that Ms. Southwick had ever looked inside the container 
and seen the residue. Therefore, as to the methamphetamine residue on the scale, there was no 
proof of knowledge. 
Moreover, even if the lack of proof of knowledge of the residue is overlooked, the state 
also failed to present evidence that Ms. Southwick had the power and the intent to control the 
residue. Compare, State v. Burnside, 115 Idaho 882, 885, 771 P.2d 546, 549 (Ct. App. 1989), 
holding that evidence was insufficient to prove control over illegal mushrooms contained in a 
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black vinyl bag found in Burnside's car while Burnside was driving when the state failed to rebut 
another's testimony of sole ownership. 
With regard to the baggie, the state proved neither knowledge nor the power and intent to 
exercise dominion and control. The state proved that the baggie was down inside the passenger 
door and not accessible except through the use of tools. The state offered no proof that Ms. 
Southwick knew of the baggie nor that, if she knew of it, she had the power or the intent to 
control it. 
Sgt. Hanner's testimony about how he extends every traffic stop beyond its initial purpose 
to include questioning about whether the vehicle contains any contraband and Ms. Southwick's 
answers to his inquiries does not alter the lack of proof. Sgt. Hanner testified that Ms. Southwick 
was quick to answer that the car did not contain marijuana but was more hesitant when 
questioned about metharnphetamine and paraphernalia. However, her knowledge of 
paraphernalia in the car is not probative of her knowledge of residue on the paraphernalia as there 
was no evidence that she had ever looked inside the zippered case or been told by the owner of 
the scale that there was residue on the scale or that she had any power or intent to control that 
residue. And, her hesitation over the question about methamphetarnine was consistent with 
knowledge that Mr. Mingo was in the car and that, based upon her knowledge of him, he may 
have been carrying methamphetamine, but was not probative that she had the power or the intent 
to control any metharnphetamine he may have secreted into the car. 
The evidence presented by the state was not substantial evidence upon which a reasonable 
trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained the burden of proving the essential 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Warburton, supra; State v. Knutson, supra; Curry, supra. 
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The evidence was insufficient to prove knowledge and power and intention to control. 
Therefore, the conviction must be reversed and a judgment of acquittal entered. 
B. Failure to Give a Unanimity Instruction was Fundamental Error 
As set out above, Ms. Southwick's conviction must be reversed and an acquittal entered 
because the evidence was constitutionally insufficient. But, even if the evidence had been 
sufficient, reversal would be required because the court failed to give a unanimity instruction. 
"In all felony cases, the jury's verdict must be a unanimous verdict." Idaho Const. Art. I, 
§ 7; State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 977-78, 188 P.3d 912, 919-920 (2008). In this case, the 
state presented evidence going to two discrete acts - possession of the residue on the scale and 
possession of the baggie - each of which, had they been proved, would independently support a 
conviction for possession. Therefore, the jury should have been instructed that it must 
unanimously agree on the specific occurrence constituting the offense. State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 
950, 957-58, 231 P.3d 1047, 2054-55 (Ct. App. 2010), citing Idaho Const. Art. I,§ 7; LC.§§ 19-
2316 and 2317; ICR 31; State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,701,215 P.3d 414,431 (2009); State 
v. Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 167-68, 90 P.3d 910, 917-18 (Ct. App. 2004); Miller v. State, 135 
Idaho 261, 266-68, 16 P.3d 937, 942-44 (Ct. App. 2000). 
While no objection was raised below, the error may be addressed under the fundamental 
error doctrine. "Though ICR 30(b) requires objections to jury instructions be made below, this 
Court reviews fundamental errors in jury instructions even in the absence of an objection below." 
State v. Johnson, supra, citing State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749, 170 P.3d 886, 892 (2007). 
See also, State v. Gerado, 147 Idaho 22, 29,205 P.3d 671,678 (Ct. App. 2009). See also, State 
v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345,364,313 P.3d 1, 20 (2012), applying a fundamental error analysis per 
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State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,245 P.3d 961 (2010), to jury instruction issues raised for the first 
time on appeal. 
As held in Perry, the fundamental error doctrine requires a three prong inquiry wherein 
the appellant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the error ( 1) violated one or 
more of the appellant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists, without the need for 
any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to 
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision, and (3) was not harmless. 150 Idaho at 227-
28, 245 P.3d at 979-80, as quoted in State v. Dunlap, supra. 
In this case, the failure to give a unanimity instruction violated Ms. Southwick's state and 
federal constitutional rights to a unanimous jury verdict, rights the record shows that she did not 
waive. Idaho Const. Art. I,§ 7; United States Const. Amends. 6 and 14. Smith v. State, 146 
Idaho 822,835,203 P.3d 1221, 1234, ftnt. 11 (2008), noting that there is a presumption against 
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and waiver will not be presumed based upon a silent 
record. Thus, the first prong of Perry's fundamental error test is met. 
Moreover, the error was plain. Idaho case law holds that "[a] specific unanimity 
instruction is required ... when it appears ... that a conviction may occur as the result of 
different jurors concluding that the defendant committed different acts." State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 
170, 172, 90 P.3d 920, 922 (Ct. App. 2004). 
Where the evidence indicates that separate and distinct incidents of criminal 
conduct could provide a basis for a juror's finding of guilt on the criminal charge 
in any count, the trial court must instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree 
on the specific incident constituting the offense in each count, regardless of 
whether the defendant requests such an instruction. 
Id., citing Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 266-68, 16 P.3d 937, 242-44 (Ct. App. 2000). 
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[Where] several distinct criminal acts support one count, jury unanimity must be 
protected by the state's election of the act upon which it will rely for conviction or 
by a clarifying instruction requiring the jurors to unanimously agree that the same 
underlying criminal act has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Gain, 140 Idaho at 173, 90 P .3d at 923 ( emphasis original). 
In this case, evidence of two distinct acts was presented regarding the single count of 
possession - the alleged possession of the residue on the scale and the alleged possession of the 
baggie found inside the passenger door. Yet, the state did not elect a single one of these acts to 
support the charges. Rather, it expressly relied on both. Given these circumstances, failure to 
give a unanimity instruction was plain error. Id. Thus, the second prong of Perry's :fundamental 
error analysis is met. 
Lastly, the error was not harmless. An error is not harmless if there is a reasonable 
possibility that it affected the outcome of the trial. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228,245 P.3d at 980. As 
discussed above, the evidence was insufficient to prove possession of either the residue on the 
scale or the baggie inside the passenger door panel. Given the insufficiency of the evidence, 
there is a reasonable possibility that the error in not giving a unanimity instruction affected the 
outcome of the case. It is reasonably possible that the state did not convince all twelve jurors of 
possession of both the residue and the baggie. And, if not all twelve were convinced of both, it is 
reasonably possible that had a unanimity instruction been given, a guilty verdict would not have 
been returned. Thus, the third prong of Perry is satisfied. 
The failure to give the unanimity instruction was fundamental error which requires 
reversal. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Ms. Southwick asks this Court to vacate the conviction and enter a judgment of acquittal 
because the evidence was constitutionally insufficient. In the alternative, she asks that this Court 
reverse her conviction because the district court committed fundamental error in not giving a 
unanimity instruction. 
1'h 
Respectfully submitted this 15-day of April, 2014. 
Deborah Whipp!~ 
Attorney for Tami Southwick 
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